Time and Crisis: Questions for Psychoanalysis and Race by Spillers, Hortense
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVI, No 2 (2018)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2018.855 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No 
Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 
This journal is operated by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh 
as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is co-sponsored by the 
University f Pittsburgh Press 
Time and Crisis 
Questions for Psychoanalysis and Race 
Hortense Spillers 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy - Revue de la philosophie 
française et de langue française, Vol XXVI, No 2 (2018) pp.  25-31 
Vol XXVI, No 2 (2018) 
ISSN 1936-6280 (print) 
ISSN 2155-1162 (online) 
DOI 10.5195/jffp.2018.855 
www.jffp.org 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVI, No 2 (2018)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2018.855 
Time and Crisis 
Questions for Psychoanalysis and Race  
Hortense Spillers 
Vanderbilt University 
 
Ta-Nehesi Coates’s Between the World and Me poses as an extended epistle 
written to his son. Performed on an analogy with James Baldwin’s Fire Next 
Time, whose first essay “My Dungeon Shook” is dedicated to Baldwin’s 
nephew “on the Hundreth Anniversary of the Emancipation,” Coates’s work, 
whose title also reiterates that of a poem by Richard Wright, is published in 
the wake of a series of very public and very horrific police and vigilante 
crimes that riveted public attention in the United States between 2012 and 
2016, beginning with the gunning down of Trayvon Martin in the state of 
Florida. Indeed this spectacle of depredations appears to match a profile of 
predictable executions and outcomes so definitively pursued that it makes 
perfect sense to think of the upshot as a nationally-aimed police conspiracy, 
directed at African-American citizens, mostly young males, who lost their 
lives for no good reason, and it is not entirely clear to me now that we stand 
today on the other side of this quite remarkable deluge. In any case, Coates, 
putting himself in a Baldwinian posture, more than fifty years after “My 
Dungeon Shook,” takes up matters that are still alive and brewing on U.S soil 
so that the passage of time between Wright, Baldwin, and Coates might be 
demarcated according to radical transformations in the material culture and 
in representational features of the public sphere, but Coates, like Baldwin, is 
addressing the subjective aspects of time, and for him, not enough has changed 
that he does not feel the necessity to send up warning flares from his 
location—from father to son. If Baldwin in the nineteen-sixties believed that 
the U.S Republic was celebrating the One-Hundreth Anniversary of 
Emancipation an entire century “too soon,” then how much farther removed 
from the sounds of grace might Richard Wright’s narrator in his poem have 
felt in the awful nineteen-thirties? In this triumvirate of personalities and 
motives—from Wright and Baldwin to Coates—over seventy years of life, 
labor, and loss—we encounter in the abrupt collapse of time and space the 
essential elements of the “crisis” that configures black passage in the New 
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World. These lines of kinship, both consanguineous and ineffable, travelling 
from father to son, from uncle to nephew, from one generation to the next, 
lend us a figurative rhythm that grasps the notion of the processional—the 
traversal of time and space that remains fundamentally mysterious, just as we 
can put our finger directly on the problem—black life is still as endangered 
and precarious as it ever was. 
 If one regards such passage as a “crisis,” then it is precisely because it 
is riddled with turning points, sudden ruts and rifts in the road when the way 
seemed smooth and clear—those moments when decisions must be made—
and from that perspective, African-American cultural apprenticeship offers, 
by definition, crisis not as a state of exception, but rather, as a steady state, 
given historical pressures that bear in on it and that become, as a result, 
intramural pressures. How one views black others. It is the latter—what 
happens when messages that originate elsewhere are assumed as a symptom 
of my own becoming—that commentators have been preoccupied with 
precisely from one generation to the next. Coates in that sense joins a long and 
distinguished line of thinkers and writers before him, of which Wright and 
Baldwin are only two of many. What I wish to do in these remarks is to 
attempt to clarify one of the questions engendered by this predicament, and 
that is to say, the riddle of identity and how it matters, but even more than an 
inquiry into the identitarian, I am searching for a protocol through intramural 
space. These remarks should be considered as notes toward a more 
comprehensive grasp of the problem at hand. 
 
       II 
 A little less than midway through Between the World and Me, Coates 
explains that one of the lessons of his parenting has been his attempt to raise 
his son, Samori Toure, “to respect every human being as singular.”1 Relatedly, 
Coates believes that such respect “must extend…into the past.” In elaboration 
of the point, his next step seems to overwhelm the bounds of intimacy that 
frame the whole discourse and take hold instead of a far broader stage of 
reference, though the move is hardly irrelevant: “Slavery,” he begins, “is not 
an indefinable mass of flesh. It is a particular, specific enslaved woman, whose 
mind is active as your own, whose range of feeling is as vast as your own; 
who prefers the way the light falls in one particular spot in the woods, who 
enjoys fishing where the water eddies in a nearby stream, who loves her 
mother in her own complicated way, thinks her sister talks too loud, has a 
favorite cousin, a favorite season, who excels at dress-making and knows, 
inside herself, that she is as intelligent and capable as anyone. . . .”2  
 Coates concocts this hypothetical scene, with its nineteenth-century 
pastoral flavors, from a composite of historiographical sketches of black life 
under slavery’s regimen, but by invoking it, he is insisting, I believe, that we 
make every effort to understand the enslaved in the fullness of their humanity 
H o r t e n s e  S p i l l e r s  |  2 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVI, No 2 (2018)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2018.855 
rather than the empty ciphers of log books and accounting columns against 
which background the enslaved’s humanity is evacuated, is checked at the 
door. The common historical thread that by implication weaves at least three 
generations of interlocutors together is Coates’s evocation of the black body; a 
general schema, a heuristic device that operates across time, through time, 
unaltered by circumstance and particularity, Coates’s “black body” is 
certainly recognizable, though I’d have much preferred a different metonymic 
collapse precisely because black humanity cannot be reduced to its body. But 
in articulating to his son and his son’s generation what paradigmatically lies 
ahead, Coates takes recourse to body image because he wants to dissociate 
body from something else—soul comes to mind—and what soul ontologically 
guarantees; but it was the body that was stolen, alienated, tortured, starved, 
fractured, labored to death and streamlined for its sexual and reproductive 
function. Between the World and Me is addressing, then, this sustained ordeal 
and its aftermath, as Coates assures the reader that he was so hailed by his 
father and that father by his own. Coates asserts: “This is your country, this is 
your world, this is your body, and you must find some way to live within the 
all of it.” Within the all of it. In The Fire Next Time, Baldwin makes powerful 
appeal to what he calls the few relatively conscious blacks and whites in the 
belief that the acquisition of a certain level or degree of consciousness would 
not only harmonize race relations in the U.S, but that in doing so, we would 
“achieve our country.” As he puts it in the closing argument of the essay: “If 
we—and now I mean the relatively conscious whites and the relatively 
conscious blacks, who must, like lovers, insist on, or create, the consciousness 
of the others—do not falter in our duty now, we may be able, handful that we 
are, to end the racial nightmare, and achieve our country, and change the 
history of the world.” With this prophetic gesture, Baldwin could make his 
readers believe that indeed such a thing was possible! 
 In the instance of African-American culture, certainly from Baldwin’s 
and Coates’s points of view, as expressed in The Fire Next Time and its epigone, 
Between the World and Me, the crisis at hand is confronted at the level of the 
body—the markings and stigmata of skin color and pigmentation and the 
damaging regimes of public relations built up from the latter—but its 
resolution, long deferred, would take another route, paradoxically, the 
transliteration of the bodily into consciousness, or we might say, after 
Baldwin’s peroration, the work of soul-craft: just as Du Bois limned parallel 
lines between black reconstruction and the revitalization of American 
democracy, Baldwin literally predicates the outcome of national destiny on 
the salvific stance of the few—the black few, chief among them. In short, 
Baldwin is calling on black America to embody the moral conscience of the 
nation as Du Bois had done long before. Even though Coates does not go that 
far, the potential to reach such heights is vaguely outlined by way of his 
insistence that his son assume the historical dimensions of memory in 
undertaking to understand the very predicament of the bonded. In a sense, 
the “predicament” reaches closure in Emancipation and constitutional 
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maneuver, but the long red record of violence attests that sermons and 
legislation, bodies surrendered in sacrifice, and careful attention to the duties 
of citizenship have not been sufficient. If that is so, then the crisis of 
enslavement, acquiring other ways and means, touches down on 
contemporary ground as the noise of Ferguson, Missouri, Flint, Michigan, 
Staten Island, New York, Sanford, Florida, Waller County, Texas and 
numerous other ports of call, both well-known and obscure, that riddle the 
landscape of our nightmarish half-awakening. Bothered, then, by what was, 
which remains what is, we bear on the pulse of the nerve, down to the present 
day, an historical antagonism that would transform itself into an askesis, or a 
discipline that would make room for a paradoxical possibility—to achieve 
both distance from the predicament, as we live it.  
 This “hermeneutic demand” to interpret the situation of blackness in 
the process of living it has yielded over time a varied conceptual and 
theoretical response, beginning systematically with the work of W.E.B. Du 
Bois. In fact, Du Bois encounters “soul” as the chief theoretical device that he 
mobilizes against his notion of America’s “dusty desert of dollars and 
smartness.” But further, Du Bois’s systematic deployment of “soul-craft,” or 
what we might call African-American subjecthood/subjectivity as it refracts 
and reflects on the surround, is poised on the contemporary scene as “the 
problem of the Negro as a problem for thought.”3 Du Boisian ontology might 
be brought alongside a psychoanalytic protocol, which has the advantage of 
positing an occasion for the recognition of a putative collective, as well as the 
predicament of the “one.” My own interest in a psychoanalytic problematic 
in relationship to this class of historical actors is predicated on two related 
premises, both translated from the Freudian-Lacanian synthesis; not by any 
mean suggesting the desirability of a wholesale application of any 
psychoanalytic regime to African-Diasporic life worlds, I am interested in the 
investigation of 1) discourse as the locus of a “situation-specificity.” If the 
unconscious is “structured like a language,” as the Lacanians contend, and if 
“linguistic structure gives its status to the unconscious,” then the investigator 
wishes to discover where a subject-subjectivity is located. There is significant 
critical resistance to this notion and to the repertoire of conceptual 
apparatuses to which it belongs precisely because there is no steady 
ontological ground or disposition that black personality inhabits. In Afro-
pessimism, for example, Frank Wilderson, as one of its major theorists, starts 
from the premise that black culture and, therefore, black subjectivity, 
demarcates a highly uncertain proposition, or does not exist all, on the basis 
of what Orlando Patterson advances as “social death.”4 I start from an 
analogous configuration of historiographical and historical data and reach a 
different conclusion—2) because the subject of “social death” has been barred 
from language—in fact, the latter might be thought of as the founding 
proposition of blackness in the Western context—then all the more reason 
why such language in this subjective formation must be revealed.  
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 This specific linguistic and discursive “retrieval” –we could call it—is 
possible, I believe, because the subject of “social death” becomes, in the words 
of Fred Moten, objects that “can and do resist.”5 The passage that I read earlier 
from Coates’s fictionalization of an enslaved person is noteworthy as regards 
the resisting object: instead of presenting the face of a passive unmoving foil 
to the human wishes and willing of another, Coates’s anonymous figure is 
imagined to be fully dimensional. I would name this dimensionality the “one 
who counts” from the Lacanian notion. As I have attempted to demonstrate 
elsewhere, the “one” stands in stark contrast to the “individual” with its 
accents and overtones that index property and ownership. The subject of 
discourse and the “one who counts” would allow an inquiry into personality, 
or one in relation to others. As personality assumes the forward position, 
stigmata, in my estimation, recedes to background. Another way to put this 
would be to say that the movement toward subject positioning is anti-racist 
in its impulses, inasmuch as a racialized perception of reality aims its 
weapons toward the undifferentiated—it swallows whole masses of 
humanity down the gullet so that empirically millions of subjects might be 
metonymically reduced to a repertory of traits—the individual stands for the 
“race,” the “race” for the individual in perfect synecdochic complementarity. 
The “one” intervenes on this ease of motion where it matters—on the ground 
of the local, “at home,” we might say, insofar as its opening gambit denotes 
what the subject speaks, what the subject is spoken. The “one” might well 
overlap the “individual,” sharing some of its traits—the proper name, for 
instance—but the former seems to exceed the latter in both priority and 
emphasis to the extent that individualism is predicated on the rights of 
property and what is permissible by law.  
 At a gathering of scholars from the trans-African world the past 
summer, one of the questions broached had to do with the after-life of the 
Middle Passage—what series of events transpired in the interior spaces of the 
enslaved that implicates and signifies on the African societies that incurred 
the massive losses over three centuries? Clearly, there are neither simple 
answers here, nor might they be provided, even approached, in short order; 
perhaps the first obligation would be a clarification of the question itself, 
which I would pose as a suppositional and hypothetical tissue of riddles that 
defy resolution: the transgenerational transfer of guilt and trauma that 
traverses Africanity across time and space. These questions, which we might 
sketch in sequence on some other occasion, would highlight the turning 
points of generational procession on one side of the Atlantic, where this talk 
began. But what about the other side where the unfathomable journey of 
radical transformation commences? On either side of the Atlantic, a question 
that might be transparently, at least straightforwardly, posed—what were the 
objective conditions seven centuries ago that led to the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade?—conduces to the problem of the African Oedipus.6  Frantz Fanon, the 
ever-skeptical psychoanalytic practitioner, half-jokingly contended once 
upon a time that there was no such thing among sub-Saharan African 
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societies: “It is too often forgotten that neurosis is not a basic element of 
human reality. Like it or not, the Oedipus complex is far from coming into 
being among Negroes.”7 Fanon goes on to argue in this text that black 
personality does not have time to develop a neurosis around such a complex 
because life bears in on him/her with such ferocity that their responses are 
always drawn to the moment of his/her black body in a white world—the 
crisis of Ferguson, Missouri, for example. But if Fanon is right, and I, for one, 
very much doubt that he is, then we have much explaining to do, i.e. the 
transfer of authority along vertical and horizontal axes, which trammeled 
passage engenders intramural violence at unfathomable levels of repetition 
and mindlessness. Even though Ferguson was generated from an “outside,” 
there is enough disharmony on the interior that we are worried to name its 
source, and my contention is that these homicidal impulses start up from first 
things that disappear into the obscure past of troubled relations between 
elders and the younger.8 There is no doubt that the abeyance of the 
speculative is encouraged to transpire in light of an immediate threat, but too 
much of life is spent under differentiated circumstances. We are interested in 
a more acute understanding of black personality’s total predicament and 
his/her passage through everyday life. In order to execute a deeper 
conceputualization of the totality, we look toward reports from the mental 
theatre of black lifeworlds. While Coates’s Between the World and Me does not 
engage this dimension of critical inquiry, he is at least headed in the right 
direction, and that is to say, words that travel between fathers and sons and 
mothers and daughters on the vertical axis of the transfer of power and 
authority—nothing less than a perception of time and crisis.  
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